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THE CONTINUED PERSECUTION OF THE KURDISH
PEOPLE IN TURKEY
James L. Crawford*
Kurds have no friends but the mountains.
— Kurdish Proverb1
Introduction
On September 13, 2007, the General Assembly adopted the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) by an
overwhelming majority.2 The UNDRIP was a product of over two decades
of negotiations.3 In response to the Assembly’s adoption of the UNDRIP,
Les Malezer, a Chairperson of the Global Indigenous Caucus, asserted that
“the United Nations and indigenous people had found common ground” by
enshrining rights that were already approved by the United Nations system
but denied to indigenous people.4
While there was a significant consensus on the declaration’s provisions,
some countries, including the United States, expressed “concerns over
provisions on self-determination” and the possibility they might be
construed as giving indigenous peoples rights to “veto national legislation
and State management of resources.”5 Expanding and clarifying the
definition of indigenous people under the UNDRIP to include the Kurdish
people will provide clear rights recognized by the greater international
community, helping the Kurdish people to maintain their culture and
heritage in the face of persecution.
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Quoted in Chikara Hashimoto & Egemen B. Bezci, Do the Kurds Have ‘No Friends
but the Mountains’? Turkey’s Secret War Against Communists, Soviets and the Kurds, 52
MIDDLE E. STUD. 640, 640 (2016).
2. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights
of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says
President, U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Press Release, GA
Adopts UNDRIP], https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga10612.doc.htm (“By a vote of 143 in
favour to 4 against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), with 11
abstentions, the Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.”).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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The subject of the independence of the Kurdish people in the Middle East
is one which has been at the forefront of my mind for nearly two decades. I
spent over fifteen years in the United States Marine Corps before retiring in
2018. During my time in the military, I served as both an infantryman and an
intelligence specialist. Over the course of my career, I deployed to the Middle
East a total of three times with nearly two years spent living with, interacting
with, training, and, at times, fighting against the many cultural and ethnic
groups that make up this diverse region of the world.

I trained and taught our allies to not only improve in their ability to
protect themselves and their land from our common enemies, but I also
managed and conducted their troops in a way that would garner their
respect and loyalty. During my second deployment, I was embedded with
an Iraqi infantry battalion. During this time, I lived among Iraqi soldiers,
including Iraqi Kurds. In doing so, I interacted with them on a personal
level, heard their stories, learned about their families, ideals, and opinions
of the then-current political atmosphere.
During my third deployment to the Middle East, I split time between
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, where I again lived and
worked with members of these countries’ military for an extended period.
This time afforded me a unique opportunity to immerse myself within the
cultures of these countries and gain insights not possible any other way.
The history of the Kurdish people in the entire Middle East is riddled
with violence and rebellion, mistreatment and suffering, and neglect and
uprising. In Part I, this Comment introduces the background and history of
the Kurdish people. Then, in Part II, this Comment examines Turkey’s State
of Emergency Declaration, and the United Nations reports on subsequent
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human rights violations. Part III explores Turkey’s domestic law regarding
the Kurdish people. Part IV discusses the Turkish Judiciary’s role in
Kurdish repression. Part V details the UNDRIP and ambiguities of who
qualifies as indigenous peoples. Finally, this Comment analyzes the legal
status of the UNDRIP in Part VI. This Comment not only sheds light on
some of the history of the Kurdish people, but also discusses how the
governments they pledge allegiance to have continually sought assimilation
of the Kurdish people by seeking to remove their culture, language,
identity, and basic human rights.
I. Background/History
A. Kurdish People: Origin and Historical Issues Up to World War I
The Kurdish people are a storied group with a long history of
marginalization and subjugation. “It is a sad feature of the Kurdish question
that the only times it is brought to our notice is at moments of conflict.”6
For at least the last 3,000 years, the Kurdish people have occupied the
mountainous regions that comprise portions of modern-day Turkey, Syria,
Iraq, and Iran.7 Historically, the Kurdish people consisted of independent
nomadic tribes known for their abilities to survive through numerous
difficulties, including the onslaughts of conquering armies marching across
the Anatolia and Mesopotamia regions.8

Figure 2 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018)

6. David McDowall, The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review, in THE KURDS: A
CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW 8, 8 (Philip Kreyenbroek & Stefan Sperl eds., 1992).
7. Edgar O’Ballance, THE KURDISH STRUGGLE 1920-94, at 1 (1996).
8. Id.
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The first time the Kurdish people are seen in history is in 400 B.C. during
their retreat to the Black Sea where they attacked the Xenophon’s Ten
Thousand.9 In the seventh century, Islamic armies advanced through the
region, “forcibly convert[ing]” the Kurdish people to Islam.10 Arabs were
among the first to refer to this group of people as “Kurds,” which was
derived from the word “Kardu.”11 This word refers to the mountains in the
region.12 Whole populations of tribes were eliminated, as Mongols and
Turkomans invaded Kurdish lands.13
Loyalty to a tribe generally stemmed from a mixture of kinship to tribe
members and the territory in which the tribe was settled but was not
commonly based on one or the other.14 It is difficult to measure loyalty
among the Kurdish people as their relations were rife with conflict; strong
leaders gained loyalty and support just to overthrow other tribal leaders or
to join with the ruling government of the time.15 Tribal leaders were even
willing to control surrounding tribes on behalf of the government if the
reward was high enough.16 This relative balance between the government
and tribes was maintained for centuries as long as the government did not
disturb the Kurdish territories and, in turn, the Kurdish people did not
disturb the government.17
Upon the final withdrawal of the Mongols, the Ottoman Turks made
their way into the region and clashed with the Persians, who sought control
of Anatolia and Mesopotamia.18 By the time of the Crusades, the Kurdish
people built a reputation of military effectiveness by fighting against those
who interfered with them and in their military service to the regimes in
which they were subject.19 The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries brought a
9. McDowall, supra note 6.
10. O’Ballance, supra note 7.
11. McDowall, supra note 6.
12. O’Ballance, supra note 7.
13. Id.
14. McDowall, supra note 6, at 9.
15. Id. at 9–10.
16. Id. at 10 (“As recently as the 1950s, when asked by a British diplomat what he
would do about a Kurdish tribe that was in revolt, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said
replied, ‘Oh, it’s quite simple, I shall send a bag of gold to a neighbouring chief.’”). This
lack of true loyalty to their own tribesman and culture played a significant part in hindering
their efforts to unify and promulgate an independent Kurdish state.
17. See id. at 10.
18. O’Ballance, supra note 7.
19. McDowall, supra note 6.
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time of expansion for the Kurdish people as they began to extend their
territory northward through battle.20 During the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514,
both the Persians and the Turks sought to stabilize the bordering territory
with Kurdish cooperation.21
Following the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, the Kurdish people aided the
Ottomans in defeating the Persian Empire in the region.22 The Ottomans
gifted the Kurdish commanders land and titles both to encourage their
loyalty and in anticipation of their assistance in driving the Persians further
east.23 In accepting these titles and lands, the Kurdish people became
loosely tied to the Ottoman government.24 This tie created a divide in the
Kurdish people connected to the Ottoman Empire and the Kurdish people
still under Persian rule.25
This Kurdish-Ottoman agreement was convenient and economical for
both sides since the Kurdish people were left in relative peace and their
respective governments were left with secure borders.26 Despite occasional
interreligious squabbles, this period of time saw a diminished level of
friction between the Kurdish people, who followed the Sunni sect of Islam,
and the Persians, who followed the Shia sect of Islam.27 In 1639, an area of
land where the Mesopotamian Plain and the Persian Plateau met was
demarcated in the Treaty of Zohab.28 This area encompassed the territory
inhabited by the Kurdish people.29 The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
saw little effort by either the Turks or the Persian Empire to “pacify their
Kurds” as efforts were made to expand their empires elsewhere.30 This
neglect by both governments resulted in an unstable “lawless tribal no
man’s land.”31
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, both Turkey and Persia
entered into conflict and eventually war with Russia.32 During this time, the

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 11.
Id.
O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
McDowall, supra note 6, at 11.
O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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Turkish government took back complete control of the eastern border.33
With similar decisions being made on the other side of the border by the
Persian government, instability within the region grew as the Kurdish
people were again unable to govern themselves.34 The Turkish and Persian
governments were unable to spend time or resources on the Kurdish
territories until the latter half of the century, resulting in further instability
in the region and leaving the region vulnerable to Russian conquest.35 As a
consequence of the continued Turkish and Persian power exertion, the
Kurdish people attempted multiple revolutions.36 And while some of the
tribes fought for complete independence, others simply wished to maintain
the level of relative freedom they experienced during the centuries prior.37
In 1878, the Persians strengthened their border defense and replaced
Kurdish governors with a more direct Persian administration.38 Naturally,
this brought dissatisfaction among the Kurdish people, who were unhappy
with the deprivation of authoritative positions within the Persian
government.39 As Russian troops fought the Turks, the Russians sought
support from disenfranchised Kurdish tribes.40 In 1877, some Kurdish tribes
joined the Russians as they fought in the eastern Anatolia area in a shortlived rebellion.41
After the Russians persuaded some Kurdish tribes to join their fight,
cooperation amongst tribes grew difficult and rivalries among the Kurdish
people grew.42 The resulting leadership void was filled by religious
personalities, as religious figures become the primary leaders of the tribes.43
One of the better-known religious leaders, Sheikh Ubeidullah of the
Nakshbandi order, was among the first to suggest the Kurdish people be
autonomous rather than ruled by two separate governments.44 In 1880,
Ubeidullah gathered support from Kurds on both sides of the line—
Ottoman ruled and Persian ruled—and pushed east into Persian territory

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

McDowall, supra note 6, at 11.
Id.
O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 6–7.
McDowall, supra note 6, at 11.
Id.
O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss2/4

No. 2]

COMMENTS

333

with the intent of “pushing [out] Persian security forces” and establishing a
“Kurdish Autonomous State,” pledging allegiance to Turkey.45
While the Turkish government originally supported the idea of an
autonomous Kurdish territory, it quickly backtracked after considering the
consequences of an autonomous Kurdish territory on its volatile eastern
border.46 This withdrawal of support from the Turkish government, as well
as the loss of support from Kurdish tribesman, resulted in the first of many
recorded unsuccessful attempts in securing an autonomous Kurdish state.47
Even so, many of the tribal governors were uncomfortable with the idea of
becoming an autonomous nation as it could have a negative impact on their
accustomed status and power as Sunni Muslim subjects of an Islamic
Empire.48
In 1907, Persia was divided into two separate areas of influence: the
north was taken by the Russians and the south by the British.49 Weak
government caused instability within the northern region, occupied by the
Kurdish people, allowing Turkish troops to enter in 1908.50 In 1911, the
Tehran government sent a militarized police force to the area in efforts to
control the unrest.51 However, this effort was unsuccessful and gave way to
a Russian invasion in portions of the territory later that year.52
In 1908, the Turkish government was overthrown by the Young Turks
with the promise of reform and representation of all people in the Ottoman
Empire.53 With this change in power and political ideals, the Kurdish
nationals were able to form several political clubs with the goal of reaching
other Kurdish people.54 However, the clubs were unsuccessful in reaching
their fellow tribesman as the Turkish government saw these clubs as a
threat and subsequently interfered in their efforts.55
World War I began in August 1914 where the Allies fought the Central
Powers.56 The Kurdish people and the Ottoman Empire fought alongside

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
See id.
Id.
O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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the Central Powers beginning in October of the same year.57 Armenian
irregulars soon advanced into Turkey followed by the Russians.58 The
resulting occupation led to a large-scale genocide of nearly 600,000
Kurdish people.59 The Armenians killed and looted as they pushed forward
into Ottoman territory until they were routed by Turkish troops.60 This
vicious attack on the Kurdish population would be avenged as the Turkish
government launched its own genocide campaign against the Armenians
and then relocated the remaining Kurdish people into their de-populated
villages.61
In 1917, the Russian Revolution took place.62 During this revolution,
Russian troops shot their officers and attempted to return home, procuring
abandoned weapons and ammunition which fostered further instability
within the Kurdish region.63
B. Current Issues (Post-World War I)
Today, the Kurdish people are one of the largest ethnic groups without a
state.64 In fact, Kurdish people are the fourth-largest ethnic group in the
Middle East and still inhabit their historical lands.65 Arguably, the modern
drive for Kurdish independence began with the fall of the Ottoman
Empire.66 In the aftermath of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson
produced a Fourteen-Point Program for World Peace, stating that “nonTurkish minorities of the Ottoman Empire should be assured of an absolute,
unmolested opportunity for autonomous development.”67 However, the
Kurdish people lacked unity as a group, leaving them unable to take
advantage of the situation to demand a state of their own.68
Instead, the Allies and the forming Turkish government ratified the
Treaty of Sèvres, which established an Armenian state and left the Kurdish

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id.
64. The Time of the Kurds, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.
cfr.org/interactives/time-kurds#!/?cid=soc-at-the_time_of_the_kurds-infoguide.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 12.
68. Id. at 13.
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people without a state.69 In anticipation of potential conflicts between the
newly established Armenian state and the Kurdish people, the two groups
prepared a memorandum to allow for the establishment of a Kurdish state if
the Kurdish people made a formal request to the League of Nations.70 This
memorandum was included in the Treaty of Sèvres and the Turkish
government agreed to its provisions in 1920.71
The hopes for an independent Kurdish state, however, were quickly
halted when Turkish General, Mustafa Kemal, led a revolt against the
Treaty of Sèvres.72 Mustafa Kemal “repudiated his government’s
submission at Sèvres, raised the flag of revolt in the name of the Muslims
of Anatolia, and drove out the Christian forces in the west (Greece) and the
east (Armenians and Soviets).”73 Concerned with a growing threat from the
USSR, “[n]one of the Allies were prepared to enforce any of the Treaty of

69. Id. After WWI, the Armenians rallied much support from the allies for having
suffered so much during the war. Id. at 12. The Armenians and the Kurds presents a joint
memorandum at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919 in preparation for becoming
autonomous regions. Id. at 13. This memorandum was included in the Treaty of Sèvres. Id.
Unhappy with the thought of an autonomous Armenia in Turkey, Kurdish forces along with
Turkish officers forced the group from eastern Turkey. Id. at 13–14.
70. Id. at 13. The language in the Treaty of Sèvres provided:
If after one year has elapsed since the formation of the present treaty, the
Kurdish population of the areas designated calls on the Council of the League
of Nations and demonstrates that a majority of the population in those areas
wishes to become independent of Turkey, and if the Council then estimates that
the population in question is capable of such independence and recommends
that it be granted, then Turkey agrees, as of now, to comply with this
recommendation and to renounce all rights and titles to the area. . . . If and
when the said renunciation is made, no objection shall be raised by the main
Allied powers should the Kurds living in that part of Kurdistan at present
included in the vilayet of Mosul seek to become citizens of the newly
independent Kurdish state.
Id. (quoting Treaty of Peace with Turkey (Treaty of Sèvres), art 64 (May 1, 1920),
https://web.archive.org/web/20140531175547/http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1920/TS00
11.pdf).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 14. The main goal of the “Turkish hero,” General Mustafa Kemal, was to
purge Turkey of Christian influence and ideals to create Muslim unity. Id. Along with the
Armenians, Kemal pushed further west to fight the Greeks to prevent them from regaining
land they had been granted in the Treaty of Sèvres. Id. In 1922, after the signing of the
Treaty of Lausanne, Kemal deprived the leaders of the Kurdish people of their religious
authority. Id. at 14–15.
73. McDowall, supra note 6, at 14.
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Sèvres conditions that would have involved military force; nor were they
prepared to negotiate on behalf of . . . the Kurds.”74
As a result, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923,
superseding the Treaty of Sèvres.75 The Treaty of Lausanne was an
agreement which recognized the new Ankara-based “nationalist”
government.76 The main difference between the two treaties was that the
Treaty of Lausanne did not recognize Kurdish national rights or even
directly refer to the Kurdish people.77 As such, districts inhabited by the
Kurdish people were kept under Turkish control.78 The signing of the
Treaty of Lausanne with no mention of an independent Kurdish state
signaled the end of Allied support for a unified Kurdistan.79
In the early 1960s, a new regime brought some hope—albeit shortlived—of an independent Iraqi Kurdish state. In 1963, the leader of Iraq,
Abdel Karim Qassim, was deposed from his office in a coup.80 The reported
response from the United States government was to support the new
incoming government led by members of a secular Arab nationalist
movement, the Iraqi Baath Party.81 In 1970, the Kurdish Democratic Party
and the then-vice president of the new central government in Iraq, Saddam
Hussein, reached an agreement.82 This agreement assured the Kurdish
people there would be more autonomy within the Kurdish occupied regions
of Northern Iraq.83 However, a few years later, the United States
government saw the Iraqi Baath Party as a threat.84 President Richard
Nixon, along with the Shah of Iran, began funding Kurdish militia groups in
the Kurds’ pursuit of true autonomy.85
Once again, this support for Kurdish autonomy was short-lived. In 1975,
Iraq and Iran made a surprise agreement that forced the United States to
74. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 14.
75. Djene Rhys Bajalan, The First World War, the End of the Ottoman Empire, and
Question of Kurdish Statehood: A ‘Missed’ Opportunity?, 18 ETHNOPOLITICS 13, 15 (2019).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 14.
80. Rick Noack, The Long, Winding History of American Dealings with Iraq’s Kurds,
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017, 4:50 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2017/10/17/the-long-winding-history-of-american-dealings-with-iraqs-kurds-2/.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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cease all funding to the Kurdish rebels.86 This cessation of support
increased the Kurdish peoples’ vulnerability to an imminent attack from
Hussein.87 In 1984, armed conflict broke out among the Turkish Army and
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).88 During these conflicts, upwards of one
million Kurdish people were forced to leave their homes in both rural and
urban areas in eastern and southeastern Turkey.89 These people were forced
to settle in urban centers as well as towns in the western and southern
portions of the country.90
One of the more devastating attacks experienced by the Kurdish people
occurred in 1988.91 There, Hussein used chemical weapons against the
Kurdish people, killing thousands of Iraqi Kurds.92 At the time of this
attack, the United States had, again, officially ceased all relations with the
Kurdish rebels it recently supported.93 While arbitrary arrests and torture
were common, the Turkish state was only able to maintain control of the
southeastern territory of Turkey though the forced evacuation of over 3,000
villages, which forced three million Kurdish people into destitution.94
C. The Gulf War
The First Gulf War began when Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait in 1990,
ending the estrangement of the United States and the Kurdish people, which
spanned over a decade.95 Even after Iraq was defeated in Kuwait, uprisings
from Shiite Iraqis and Iraqi Kurds continued without support from the
United States government.96 With the close of the Gulf War in 1991, the
United States made a policy decision to avoid the risk of destabilizing Iraq
politically and stopped short of overthrowing Saddam Hussein—a decision

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Kurds, MINORITY RTS. GRP.
INT’L, https://minorityrights.org/minorities/kurds-2/ (June 2018) [hereinafter World
Directory: Kurds].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Noack, supra note 80.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. World Directory: Kurds, supra note 88.
95. Noack, supra note 80.
96. Id. (stating that, in opposition to the Shiite groups of Iraqis and Kurds, the Iraqi
Baath Party, led by President Saddam Hussein, was primarily comprised of members from
the Sunni sect of Islam).
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that would yield severe consequences for years to come.97 Hussein went on
to crush Kurdish and Shiite rebellions.98
Also in 1991, the United Nations made Iraqi Kurdish territory into a
“safe haven,” providing much needed protection for the inhabitants of those
territories.99 In the years to follow, an opposition group called the Iraqi
National Congress was established in Kurdistan with the support of the
United States.100 Even with this new sense of protection, divisions appeared
among the Kurdish people.101 As a devastating result of these divisions, the
Kurdish Democratic Party—along with the help of troops from Hussein’s
army—attacked the Iraqi National Congress in 1996, killing many rebel
fighters after the United States denied crucial support.102
D. Events After September 11, 2001
The post-war independence of Iraqi Kurds made Turkey extremely
nervous. Bombing and counter-insurgency operations continued into 2012,
causing death and displacement on both sides.103 Despite these violent
occurrences, ceasefire negotiations began in October, 2012.104 In 2013, a
ceasefire was enacted between the PKK and the Turkish government, which
brought hope for an end to decades of dispute and violence.105 However,
two years later, the ceasefire ended and ushered in a new wave of violent,
destructive conflict.106 This resurgence of conflict prompted harsh
restrictions by the Turkish government.107 In efforts to restrict PKK
soldiers, the Turkish government severely restricted the Kurdish peoples’
ability to demonstrate, access websites related to their cause, and move
freely, with the implementation of curfews.108 The Turkish government also
limited the Kurdish peoples’ access to electricity, food, water, and medical

97. ANGEL M. RABASA ET AL., RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE, THE MUSLIM WORLD AFTER
9/11, at 3 (2004), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_M
G246.pdf.
98. Id.
99. Noack, supra note 80.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. World Directory: Kurds, supra note 88.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss2/4

No. 2]

COMMENTS

339

treatment.109 While the PKK is responsible for many violent attacks, the
Turkish government responded with widespread human rights abuses,
including torture, murder, and the mass shelling of predominately Kurdish
areas, causing extensive destruction and displacement of hundreds of
thousands of residents.110
In September 2017, independence reform overwhelmingly supported by
Iraqi Kurds raised tensions between the Iraqi cities of Erbil and Baghdad.111
This reform caused President Haider al-Abadi to demand its annulment
with the threat of isolation to the landlocked region.112 Independence of the
Kurdish people in Iraq would have caused significant concern for the
neighboring countries of Iran, Syria, and Turkey; such independence would
likely encourage the uprising of Kurdish tribes in those countries while
providing a place of safe harbor for Kurdish rebels.113 Turkey and the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), formed strong economic ties to
include a prosperous oil trade, via oil pipeline, which was threatened to be
shut down in retaliation for the independence reform.114 Despite threats, the
KRG continued with the referendum out of fear “that U.S. support . . . will
only dry up as the campaign against the Islamic State winds down.”115
By 2016, Turkey successfully pushed into Syria and established a “safe
zone” to house Syrian refugees forced to flee the violence that resulted from
ISIS control of Syrian land.116 Taking the ninety-eight kilometer stretch of
border between Turkey and Syria, Turkey was able to cut off the jihadists’
last remaining external pipeline.117 Though the idea for the “safe zone” for
refugees was a noble reason to push for possession of this stretch of land, it
was not the true reason for the offensive.118 The main objective of this
move was to prevent the Syrian Kurdish militia from extending its territory
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. The Time of the Kurds, supra note 64.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. As noted previously in this text, the Kurdish people had justifiable reluctance in
their reliance on support from the U.S. government for continued support which explains an
even more urgent reason to push for further autonomy and reform. See supra text
accompanying notes 85–98.
116. David Gardner, Turkey’s Syria Move Takes Aim at Both Isis and Kurds, FIN. TIMES
LTD. (Sept. 7, 2016, 2:24 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/da458526-74fa-11e6-bf48b372cdb1043a.
117. Id.
118. See id.
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further than it already had by forcing ISIS troops out of the area with the
help of U.S. air support.119 Moreover, the Turkish government used U.S.
aims of clearing ISIS from the region to justify the removal of Kurdish
militias within the safe zone.120
In December 2018, the United States announced it would withdraw
troops in Syria, following the defeat of ISIS.121 However, this decision was
scaled back as a result of criticism from Congress and opposition within the
Executive Branch.122 By August 2019, after threats from the Turkish
government to launch military operations into Syrian Kurdish-controlled
territory, the United States and Turkey set out to create the “safe zone”
previously planned in the northeastern border area of Syria.123 This
endeavor required the removal of trenches and other military barriers in the
region.124 However, Turkish officials would later inform the United States
of their plans to occupy the space rather than maintain it as a “safe zone.”125
In 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew completely from the area,
arguing that he was not willing to sacrifice American lives for “these
ridiculous Endless Wars.”126 However, the decision to withdraw from Syria
and abandon the Kurdish people was not popular among the United States
House of Representatives.127 It voted in opposition of the withdrawal and
passed a resolution to represent this opinion.128 Following this vote,
President Trump signed an executive order bringing sanctions against any
member of the Turkish government involved in the offensive strategy to
occupy Northern Syria.129 The Treasury Secretary stated: “The United
States is holding the Turkish Government accountable for escalating
violence by Turkish forces, endangering innocent civilians, and
destabilizing the region.”130
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. United States Withdraws Troops From Syria, Leaving Kurds Vulnerable, 114 AM. J.
INT’L L. 143, 143 (2020).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 144.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 145 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,894, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,851 (Oct. 14, 2019)).
130. Id. (quoting Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Designates Turkish
Ministries and Senior Officials in Response to Military Action in Syria (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm792 [https://perma.cc/NU5X-QULW]).
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During this time, Kurdish forces reached an agreement with Syrian
officials that would allow government troops to return to the northern
border to combat invading Turkish troops.131 After this agreement, Syrian
and Russian troops quickly entered the territory, filling the void left by the
United States’ troop withdrawal.132 The Turkish and Russian governments
negotiated a ceasefire, agreeing they would share supervision of the nearly
twenty-mile-wide strip of land.133 As part of this agreement, a small number
of United States troops would remain in areas containing oil.134
Shortly after this agreement, a United States military raid—aided in large
part by information gathered by Kurdish allies—was conducted in
northwestern Syria, killing prominent ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.135
After this operation, the Turkish government reiterated its plan to relocate
one million Syrian refugees into the area to be used as a “safe zone.”136
However, as of November 2019, tensions and violence in the area
continued, with nearly two million people still in need of humanitarian
care.137
Throughout the Syrian conflict, Kurdish leaders in Turkey, Iraq, and
Syria have tried to position themselves in a manner conducive with
garnering support from international allies—particularly the United States
and Europe.138 In 2015, a political party within the Kurdish government
sought to increase democratic rights for all of Turkey but primarily for the
Kurdish people.139 This push to expand Kurdish political rights was an
attempt to boost legitimacy not only for their own people but also for
Kurdish perceptions internationally.140 As the conflict in Syria intensified,
the Kurdish people pushed for greater rights.141
At the start of the war in Syria, thousands of Kurdish people were
granted citizenship and Syria refrained from conflict with them.142 As
fighting against ISIS continued in Syria and Iraq, Kurdish leaders used the
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Zeynep Kaya & Matthew Whiting, Sowing Division: Kurds in the Syrian War, 24
MIDDLE E. POL’Y 79, 81 (2017).
139. Id. at 82.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

342

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

conflict as a platform to promote their own agenda, arguing that liberation
of the Kurdish people was the same as gaining democratic rights.143 With
continued conflict in Iraq and Syria, and the subsequent weakening of the
governments, the Kurdish people were afforded greater opportunities to
move forward toward autonomy.144 However, this was not the case in
Turkey, as the Turkish government remained strong and maintained both
military and political support from international allies.145
The increased determination of Kurdish groups in Syria caused division
amongst themselves and the Kurdish people of Iraq and Turkey.146 The
emergence of the autonomous Kurdish territory in northern Syria, called
Rojava, further divided Kurdish tribes in the Middle East.147 This
development highlighted division within the Kurdish elite through the
Middle East as they fought to manipulate influence within the region to
pursue their own interests, agendas, and ideas of what the future of Kurdish
government should look like.148
Though the Syrian War brought a temporary degree of unity among
Kurdish tribes, the emergence of Rojava inevitably caused division between
the Kurdish people and emphasized their competing political interests.149
Moreover, the possibility of autonomy for the Kurdish people in Turkey
seemed nearly impossible when the United States chose to support the
Turkish government rather than the Kurdish people in Turkey’s attempts to
regain territory in the northern region.150
II. Turkey’s State of Emergency Declaration and UN Report
on Human Rights Violations
In response to what has been labeled a coup attempt in 2016, the Turkish
government declared a state of emergency leading to a “deteriorating
human rights situation, exacerbated by the erosion of the rule of law.”151
Stemming from serious concerns over actions taken by the Turkish
143. Id. at 82–83.
144. Id. at 83–84.
145. Id. at 85.
146. Id. at 83.
147. Id. at 84.
148. Id. at 88.
149. Id. at 86.
150. Id. at 88.
151. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Rep. on the Impact of the State of
Emergency on Human Rights in Turkey, Including an Update on the South-East, ¶ 1 (Mar.
2018) [hereinafter Rep. on the Impact of the State of Emergency].
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government after its declaration of a state of emergency, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report detailing
potential human rights violations in southeast Turkey.152
In Turkey’s efforts to eradicate those allegedly responsible for the failed
coup, “nearly 160,000 people [were] arrested during an 18-month state of
emergency,” including women who were pregnant or had just given
birth.153 Over 152,000 Kurdish civil servants were dismissed from
government positions, including teachers, judges, and lawyers, leading to
loss of income and eviction from publicly owned houses.154
In 2017, Turkey conducted security operations in villages “home to, in
large part, [] Kurdish residents and targeted citizens of Kurdish origin of all
ages for their perceived affiliation to the PKK.”155 The United Nations
report detailed the use of torture and ill-treatment of those in custody,
including beatings and sexual assault by Turkish police and military.156 In
addressing the situation in Turkey, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights urged the Turkish government “to ensure that these allegations of
serious human rights violations are investigated and the perpetrators are
brought to justice” while calling for “full and unfettered access” to fully
address the human rights situation.157
Actions by the Turkish government resulted in the closure of Kurdish
NGOs, the shutting down of private schools with Kurdish language
curriculums, and the dismissal of Kurdish teachers, academics, and
officials.158 Many Kurdish residents continue to be displaced from the areas
they have called home for centuries.159 While the primary reason for these
displacements remains regional conflict, other controversial development
projects, such as the 1,200 megawatt Ilisu Dam on the Tigris River threaten
large scale displacement within Kurdish areas.160 Minority Rights Group
International suggests that upwards of 78,000 people may be displaced and

152. Id.
153. Turkey: UN Report Details Extensive Human Rights Violations During Protracted
State of Emergency, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Mar. 20, 2018) [hereinafter
Turkey: UN Report], https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=22853&LangID=E.
154. Id.
155. Rep. on the Impact of the State of Emergency, supra note 151, ¶ 111.
156. Turkey: UN Report, supra note 153.
157. Id. (quoting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein).
158. World Directory: Kurds, supra note 88.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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result in the destruction of valuable Kurdish heritage, some as devastating
as the flooding and loss of the ancient city of Hasankeyf.161
III. Turkey’s Domestic Law Regarding the Kurdish People
In addition to their long history of marginalization and repression
throughout Turkey and the Middle East, the Kurdish people have seen a
concerted effort by the Turkish government to diminish or eradicate
Kurdish culture within its borders. Since the ratification of the Treaty of
Lausanne in 1922, the Kurdish people have “persistently been denied
autonomy, let alone independence, and [were] also forced to assimilate into
Turkish society.”162 Turkish attitudes toward Kurdish culture during this
period is best characterized by a statement given by a Turkish cabinet
minister: “I believe that the Turk must be the only lord, the only master of
this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have only one
right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves.”163
Turkey has consistently sought to achieve Kurdish assimilation by
restricting all aspects of Kurdish identity. In the 1920s and 1930s, Kurdish
schools, religious foundations, and publications were abolished.164 In 1938,
the use of the Kurdish language was banned, and the words “Kurd” and
“Kurdistan” disappeared from official vocabulary for an extended period.165
Kurdish people, using the only language they knew, were fined for
bargaining in Kurdish in the marketplace.166 These changes led to an
“alienat[ion] from the main-stream of public life in Turkey.”167 This ban on
the Kurdish language, coupled with the lack of Kurdish educational
facilities, publications, and broadcasts, tremendously impacts cultural
expression of Kurdish people where even the most “ardent champions of
the Kurdish cause[] find it easier to express abstract ideas in Turkish.”168

161. Id.
162. Hashimoto & Bezci, supra note 1.
163. Philip G. Kreyenbroek, On the Kurdish Language, in THE KURDS: A
CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 53, 57 (quoting the Turkish newspaper Milliyet,
Sept. 16, 1930).
164. Id. at 56; see also O’Ballance, supra note 7, at 15.
165. Kreyenbroek, supra note 163. During this period, the Kurdish people were referred
to as “mountain Turks.” Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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In the 1960s, the Kurdish people saw a temporary reprieve from overt
cultural repression by the Turkish government.169 In 1961, a new Turkish
constitution was drafted, allowing freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and freedom of the press.170 This period saw a “surge of
renewed interest among the Kurds in their own cultural identity.”171
However, the reprieve only lasted until 1967, when Turkish authorities
barred the entrance of “publications and recordings in Kurdish into Turkey
from abroad.”172
After a military coup in 1980,173 a new constitution was promulgated.174
Articles in this constitution stated that “no language prohibited by law can
be used in the expression and diffusion of opinions.”175 Further, “[n]o
person may publish in a prohibited language.”176
Further exemplifying Turkish attitudes toward the Kurdish people, new
repressive laws targeting the Kurdish language were enacted.177 For
example, in 1983 a new law declared that “[t]he native language of Turkish
citizens is Turkish”; citizens may not “use as a native language a language
other than Turkish and to participate in any activity aiming to diffuse these
languages.”178
To Turkey’s credit, the latest version of article 10 of the Turkish
Constitution does provide that “[e]veryone is equal before the law without
distinction as to language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical
belief, religion and sect, or any such grounds.”179 However, article 3
declares Turkish as the official language of Turkey180 and article 42 holds
that “[n]o language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to
Turkish citizens at any institution of education.”181 As validation of its
169. See id. at 58.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (stating that Turkish General Kenan Evren enacted a new constitution in 1982
after leading a military coup); see also David Cutler, Turkey’s 1980 Coup and Its Aftermath,
REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2012, 5:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-trial1980/factbox-turkeys-1980-coup-and-its-aftermath-idUKBRE8330F320120404?editionredirect=uk.
174. Kreyenbroek, supra note 163, at 58.
175. TURK. CONST. 1982, art. 26, quoted in Kreyenbroek, supra note 163, at 58.
176. Id. art. 28, quoted in Kreyenbroek, supra note 163, at 58.
177. See id.
178. Kreyenbroek, supra note 163, at 58 (quoting Turk. Law no. 2392, art. 3).
179. TURK. CONST. 1982, art. 10 (amended 2017).
180. Id. art. 3.
181. Id. art. 42.
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policy towards minority groups including the Turkish people, Turkey
references the Treaty of Lausanne.182
Despite language in the current Turkish Constitution that declares
equality under the law183 and a declaration citing intentions of “legalizing
the use of Kurdish in Turkey,”184 there are still restrictions in place that
effectively preclude the Kurdish people from giving their children some
Kurdish names.185 Until recently, Turkish citizens could not use minority
languages in naming their children.186 In July 2003, a “reform of the law
removed the restriction on parents’ freedom to name their children with
names ‘deemed offensive to the national culture,’ but kept the requirement
that names should ‘comply with moral values,’ and not be offensive to the
public.”187 However, “the law was restricted to curtailing names containing
the letters q, w and x, which are common in Kurdish.”188 Thus, the Turkish
laws still restrict Kurdish people “from giving their children Kurdish names
that include these letters.”189
IV. The Turkish Judiciary Role in Kurdish Repression
The Turkish judiciary is one of the “pillars of the ruling order” within the
Turkish Republic.190 Critics of the judiciary have targeted its “partisan
attitude in political tensions, and its failure to protect human rights and
defend democratic principles.”191 The Turkish judiciary occupies the middle
ground between the military and the bureaucracy, acting as “hegemonic
preservation.”192 In this role, the judiciary seeks to maintain hegemony of
the ruling elite against the pressure of society.193 The judiciary possesses
182. Firat Cengiz & Lars Hoffmann, Rethinking Conditionality: Turkey’s European
Union Accession and the Kurdish Question, 51 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 416, 420 (2013)
(“The Treaty defines minorities on the basis of religion excluding Kurds and other Muslim
minorities.”).
183. See TURK. CONST. 1982, art. 10 (amended 2017).
184. Kreyenbroek, supra note 163, at 59.
185. World Directory: Kurds, supra note 88.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Derya Bayır, Representation of the Kurds by the Turkish Judiciary, 35 HUM. RTS. Q.
116, 119 (2013).
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 214 (2004)).
193. Id. (quoting HISRCHL, supra note 192, at 98).
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“delegated power particularly ‘when the courts in that polity are generally
inclined to rule in accordance with hegemonic ideological and cultural
propensities.’”194 In furthering that observation, Esin Örücü195 argued that:
the legal system in Turkey has the aspiration to erase certain
cultures and create a new culture, thereby assimilating people
into a chosen image, when law meets cultures which it does not
cater for, the judge either endeavours to eradicate or ignore them
in keeping with the vision of the founding legislator, or, where
he can, to accommodate them within the official framework.196
A study of judgments in Turkish courts demonstrated three positions
regarding the judiciary’s representation of the Kurdish people: “(1) denying
the Kurds’ separate existence and claiming their Turkishness; (2)
acknowledging the Kurds while denying Kurdism; and (3) portraying the
Kurds’ traditional law, culture and social structure as deficient.”197 More
recently in civilian courts, the Turkish judiciary has resorted to
acknowledging the theoretical existence of Kurdish people but downplaying
any meaningful distinctions by referencing commonalities with Turkish
language, culture, and history.198 Some courts even represent Kurdish
people as the “‘other’ by referring to their traditions, customs, laws, and
other aspects of Kurdish life, as ‘primitive,’ ‘backward,’ ‘bad,’ and
‘immoral,’ thus requiring steps to modernize and civilize them.”199
Views of Kurdish people within Turkish jurisprudence, to some degree,
are traced back to official positions stemming from the Treaty of
Lausanne.200 At the Lausanne Conference, the chief negotiator201 for Turkey

194. Id.
195. Esin Örücü is a Professor Emerita of Comparative Law at the University of
Glasgow, law graduate from the University of Istanbul and noted author. Esin Orucu, UNIV.
OF GLASGOW SCH. OF L., https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/law/100years/100voices/esinorucu/
(last visited Apr. 10, 2021).
196. Bayır, supra note 190, at 120 (quoting Esin Örücü, Judicial Navigation as Official
Law Meets Culture in Turkey, 4 J. INT’L L. CONTEXT 35, 42 (2008)).
197. Id. at 120.
198. Id. at 121.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 122.
201. The chief negotiator was Ismet Pahsa, a “one-time prime minister and the second
president of Turkey.” Id.
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“declared the origin of the Kurdish people as ‘Turanian,’202 rejecting
contrary arguments.”203 In a speech at the Lausanne Conference, the
Turkish negotiator claimed that, “‘as regard[ing] manners, usage[,] and
customs the Kurds do not differ in any respect from the Turk’”; rather, “the
Turks and Kurds ‘form a single unit in respect of race, religion and
manners.’”204
Particularly in martial court judgments prior to 1990, the Turkish
judiciary attempted to eliminate the alterity of the Kurdish people by
supporting claims that Kurdish people were not distinct from Turks.205
Turkish martial courts heard cases where charges “came under the umbrella
of ‘crimes against state security,’ committed in areas where the Martial Law
was in operation.”206 Applying views expressed at the Lausanne
Conference, martial courts took positions claiming that “Kurds were a
Turkish tribe and that ‘the Kurds are not racially different to Turks.’”207
Thus, martial courts were able to “declare that the Kurds were not a ‘native
race’ . . . of Anatolia, and announced that to claim such a thing was also
factitious.”208
Prior to 1991,209 any claims of an “independent existence outside of
‘national unity’” and protection of the Kurdish people as a distinct culture
were banned.210 The “criminalization of Kurdism” was rooted in principles
of Turkish nationalism serving as the “cultural nationalism” and requiring
assimilation of all Turkish citizens into the “culture of the Turks.”211 As a
202. See Turanian, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
Turanian/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2021) (defining Turanian as “a member of any of various
peoples speaking Ural-Altaic languages.”).
203. Bayır, supra note 190, at 122–23 (quoting LAUSANNE CONFERENCE ON NEAR
EASTERN AFFAIRS, 1922-23: RECORDS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DRAFT TERMS OF PEACE 342
(1923) [hereinafter LAUSANNE CONFERENCE]).
204. Id. at 123 (quoting LAUSANNE CONFERENCE, supra note 203, at 343).
205. Id. at 121.
206. Id. at 122.
207. Id. at 123 (quoting a case document from volume 5 of a 1992 work by Turkish
sociologist İsmail Beşikçi).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 127 (“Until 1991, such demands were usually punished under Articles 141(4)
and 142(3) of the now-defunct Turkish Penal Code of 1926 . . . . These provisions penalized
‘establishing organizations,’ ‘making propaganda,’ targeting a partial or complete removal
of public rights recognized in the Constitution ‘on considerations of race’ . . . and destroying
or weakening ‘national feeling’ . . . . The charges under Article 142(3) were termed
‘Kurdism propaganda crime’ . . . by the higher courts.”).
210. Id. at 126.
211. Id. at 127.
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result, within the Turkish judiciary, “Turkish nationalism could not be
‘discriminatory or racist’” and Kurdism was labeled as “racism,” as it was
“assumed to be promoting an idea based on a distinct Kurdish ‘race’ with
its language and culture.”212 After the termination of article 142, which
made Kurdism propaganda a crime in the Turkish Penal Code until 1991,
Turkish courts continued to justify their Kurdish views under article 7 of
the “Anti-Terror Law as ‘separatist propaganda’ or as ‘propaganda aiming
to blight the state’s indivisible unity with its territory and nation.’”213
V. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People
(UNDRIP)
The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner
views the UNDRIP as the establishment of a “universal framework of
minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the
indigenous peoples of the world.”214 The Human Rights Council adopted
the UNDRIP on June 29, 2006, more than a year before the General
Assembly’s adoption.215 The General Assembly deferred consideration of
the declaration based on objections regarding the “language on selfdetermination and the definition of ‘indigenous’ people.”216
Initially, UN member states with sizable indigenous populations217
objected to the UNDRIP because of “concerns over provisions on selfdetermination, land and resources rights and, among others, language
giving indigenous peoples a right of veto over national legislation and State
management of resources.”218 The United States’ representative expressed
disappointment in the Human Rights Council’s lack of response to a call for
further work to generate a consensus text.219 Specifically, the United States’
representative stated that the splintered vote “risked endless conflicting
interpretations and debate about its application, as already evidenced by the
numerous complex interpretive statements issued by States at its adoption at
212. Id. at 127–28.
213. Id. at 128 (quoting Turk. Law no. 3717, art. 7).
214. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N.: DEP’T OF
ECON. & SOC. AFFS., https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declarationon-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html (last visited June 2, 2021).
215. Id.
216. Press Release, GA Adopts UNDRIP, supra note 2.
217. Id. Four countries voted against the initial adoption of the UNDRIP (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and eleven countries abstained. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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the Human Rights Council, and the United States could not lend its support
to such a text.”220
A. Rights-Based Framework and Rights Codified Within the UNDRIP
The UNDRIP has many provisions that would provide the Kurdish
people in Turkey with rights to protect their cultural identity, including
“both individual and collective rights; cultural rights and identity; rights to
education, health, employment, language, and others.”221 The UNDRIP,
which has now been endorsed by all countries in the United Nations and is
a product of extensive and wide-ranging drafting participation, employs a
“rights-based framework and uses rights-based language.”222
This “rights-based approach encourages cooperation and consultation
between states, Indigenous peoples, corporations, civil society and the
wider community.”223 By adopting the UNDRIP, UN member states
acknowledge they should engage Indigenous peoples while respecting their
right to assert control over their property and their economic futures.224 One
of the principle rights recognized in the UNDRIP is the right to exist.225 To
that end, article 8 of the UDNRIP establishes that “Indigenous peoples and
individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or
destruction of their culture.”226
B. Right to Self-Determination
Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination has been “described as
‘perhaps the most controversial and contested of the many controversial and
contested terms in the vocabulary of international law.’”227 So it should be
of no surprise that the UNDRIP’s provisions on the right to selfdetermination are some of the most contested provisions. Some of the
220. Id.
221. High Commissioner for Human Rights Hails Adoption of Declaration on Indigenous
Rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Sept. 13, 2007), https://newsarchive.
ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=6097&LangID=E.
222. Robert McCreery, Promoting Indigenous-led Economic Development: Why Parties
Should Consult the UNDRIP, INDIGENOUS L. BULL., Nov./Dec. 2012, at 16, 16–17.
223. Id. at 17.
224. See id.; see also G.A. Res. 61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
225. See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 224.
226. Id. at 4.
227. Mauro Barelli, Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or
Unsatisfactory Solutions?, 13 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 413, 413 (2011) (quoting James
Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and
Future, in PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 7 (Philip Alston ed., 2000)).
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distress with the right to self-determination stems from its roots with
colonialism.228 The traditional view of self-determination was formed
around the process of decolonization; generally, self-determination was
equated to the right of peoples subject to foreign occupation to create their
own State.229 However, a modern distinction has arisen between internal
and external aspects of self-determination.230 This distinction resulted in the
cessation of self-determination’s exclusive link to the idea of
independence.231
It is this idea of an “internal” right to self-determination that has
garnered support “both by academics and judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies.”232 However, states are cautious to accept any right to selfdetermination for fear that groups within their borders would view the right
to self-determination with secessionist overtones.233 It is within this context
that UN member states voted against the UNDRIP or abstained from the
vote.234
Despite initial concerns from some UN member states, the UNDRIP
includes and affirms the right to self-determination for indigenous people.
Article 3 of the UNDRIP declares that “Indigenous peoples have the right
to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”235 While a straightforward reading of article 3 leaves little
clarity upon which definition of self-determination the UNDRIP asserts, the
drafting history implies the modern view, which outlines an internal right to
self-determination.236
Moreover, article 46(1), when read in concert with article 3, limits the
right to self-determination to the modern understanding. Article 46(1) of the
UNDRIP declares that:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for
any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See id. at 413–15.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
See supra note 2.
G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 224, at 4.
See Barelli, supra note 227, at 416–23.
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action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States.237
Regardless of the limitations imposed by article 46(1), the UNDRIP is
the first international legal instrument that explicitly asserts the right to selfdetermination to indigenous peoples.238
Practically speaking, the right to self-determination asserted in the
UNDRIP is defined by some as the “the right of indigenous peoples to
freely pursue their political, economic, and social developments within the
frameworks of their respective States.”239 Essentially, the right to selfdetermination affords an indigenous group the right to participate or, more
frankly, the right to be heard and taken seriously.240 This concept represents
a widely invoked principle within bodies asserting indigenous rights: the
principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).241 FPIC is a primary
element of the right to self-determination as it “enables indigenous peoples
to exercise control not only over their lands but also over their destiny.”242
Article 32(2) of the UNDRIP asserts that:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with
the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or
other resources.243
Of note, the language in article 32(2) does not require the consent of
indigenous peoples prior to approval of projects affecting their lands or
territories.244 Instead, the language within article 32(2) only requires
consultation with indigenous people with a good faith effort of obtaining
approval.245 With that said, to comply with the provisions in the UNDRIP,
UN member states may take legitimate steps to advance economic
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 224, at 11.
See Barelli, supra note 227, at 422.
Id. at 427.
See id. at 427–34.
Id. at 431.
Id.
G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 224, at 9.
Barelli, supra note 227, at 432.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss2/4

No. 2]

COMMENTS

353

development as long as they do so while considering the “rights of
indigenous peoples, and particularly their right to self-determination, to
own their lands, and to participate in the relevant decision making
process.”246
C. Definition of “Indigenous People”
The UNDRIP does not provide any meaningful clarification on what
qualifies a group as “indigenous.” In fact, one of the key areas of concern
from members of the Human Rights Council is that “[t]here is uncertainty
as to the text’s application or non-application with respect to tribal groups,
ethnic groups, minority groups, and indigenous peoples.”247 Despite these
concerns, the UNDRIP was adopted without any clarification on who
qualifies as indigenous people risking conflicting interpretations.248
This lack of clarity may echo sentiments from a supplementary working
paper on the concept of indigenous peoples produced for the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2007. In this supplementary
paper, the working group expressed concerns over uncertainties as to who
qualified as indigenous people and whether this definition included tribal
groups, ethnic groups, or other minority groups.249 The working group
ultimately agreed not to pursue concerns regarding the definition of
“indigenous people,” citing its belief that a definition would not be
necessary if the text was consistent with international law.250 Furthermore,
the working group expressed its belief that the text should be “capable of
being universal in its scope and application” as “indigenous situations vary
from State to State and group to group.”251
Acknowledging the lack of a “singularly authoritative definition of
indigenous people” in both the UNDRIP and the greater body of
international law, the United Nations Humans Rights Office of the High
Commissioner does offer some criteria to help define “indigenous
peoples.”252 In a 2013 publication, the UN Human Rights Office utilized the
246. Id. at 434.
247. Supplement to the Rep. of the Facilitator on the Draft Declaration on the Rts. of
Indigenous Peoples, at annex I (July 20, 2007), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/
IPeoples/ReportSupplement20July07.pdf [hereinafter Supplement on Draft Declaration].
248. See Press Release, GA Adopts UNDRIP, supra note 2.
249. Supplement on Draft Declaration, supra note 247, at annex I.
250. Id. at annex III.
251. Id.
252. U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., FACT SHEET NO. 9/REV.2,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 2 (2013),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5289d7ac4.html.
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José Martinez Cobo definition to outline pertinent factors useful in
identifying “indigenous peoples.”253 United Nations Special Rapporteur
José Martinez Cobo submitted a comprehensive study on discrimination
against indigenous peoples to the Commission on Human Rights.254
Though not officially adopted by the United Nations or the international
community, Cobo’s definition is influential and frequently cited.255 Cobo’s
definition of “indigenous peoples” is constructed as:
those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and
pre-colonial societies . . . [who] consider themselves distinct
from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social
institutions and legal systems.256
So, the utilization of Cobo’s definition would begin to form some analytical
framework aiding in the identification of indigenous peoples.
D. Problems with the Colonial Definition of “Indigenous”
One issue with Cobo’s definition of “indigenous people” is that it
revolves around language limiting “indigenous” to those people who were
displaced through colonial conquest.257 This concept stems from the
European doctrine of discovery where indigenous legal status and rights
were diminished or extinguished entirely.258 This concept, and its inclusion
as part of the understanding of indigenous people, is undoubtedly highly
appropriate and relevant. However, limiting the definition of “indigenous
253. Id.
254. Megan Davis, Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: he United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 439, 442 (2008).
255. Id. at 442.
256. Id. (quoting José Martinez Cobo (Special Rapporteur), Study of the Problem of
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations — Volume 5: Conclusions, Proposals and
Recommendations, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (Mar. 1987)).
257. See Derek Inman et al., Evolving Legal Protections for Indigenous Peoples in
Africa: Some Post-UNDRIP Reflections, 26 AFRICAN J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 339, 342–43
(2018).
258. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human
Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 660, 672.
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people” with this concept is problematic in regions such as African or Asian
states where it is difficult to identify people who were “first in time.”259
The African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous
Populations/Communities (African Working Group) was tasked with
“examin[ing] the concept of indigenous people and communities in Africa”
and “consider[ing] appropriate recommendations for the monitoring and
protection of the rights of indigenous communities” in relation to the term
“peoples” within the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.260 In
its report to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
(African Commission), the African Working Group expressed concern that
“if emphasis remains on early definitions that were intertwined with
colonisation, the African continent will be left without a suitable concept
for ‘analyzing internal structural relationships of inequality that have
persisted after liberation from colonial dominance.’”261
When seeking to identify indigenous peoples in Africa, the African
Working Group endorsed the following alternative elements:
self-identification; special attachment to and use of their
traditional land whereby their ancestral land and territory has a
fundamental importance for their collective physical and cultural
survival as peoples; and experiences of subjugation,
marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination
because these peoples have different cultures, ways of life or
modes of production than the national hegemonic and dominant
model.262
In 2010, the African Commission applied its adapted view regarding
who qualifies as “indigenous people” in Centre for Minority Rights
Development & Minority Rights Group International on Behalf of Endorois
Welfare Council v. Kenya.263 The Endorois people are believed to be the

259. See Inman et al., supra note 2577, at 343 (quoting D.L. Hodgson, Becoming
Indigenous in Africa, 52 AFR. STUD. REV. 1, 8 (2009)).
260. Id. (quoting AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, RESOLUTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' COMMUNITIES IN AFRICA-RESOLUTION 51 (2000)).
261. Id. at 344 (quoting AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, REPORT OF
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS ON INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS/COMMUNITIES 93 (2005)).
262. Id.
263. Communication 276/2003, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
[Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.] (Feb. 4, 2010), https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/Endorois_
Decision.pdf; see Inman et al., supra note 257, at 345.
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traditional inhabitants of the Lake Bogoria area within Kenya.264 The
Endorois people used the lowlands surrounding Lake Bogoria during the
rainy season as grazing land for their animals and would retreat to the
Mochongoi forest during the dry season.265 Additionally, Lake Bogoria held
great cultural significance to the Endorois people; these people used sites in
the area for cultural ceremonies and believe that the “spirits of all Endorois,
no matter where they are buried, live on in the Lake.”266
The Endorois people used this land, unchallenged, for centuries.267 In
1973, however, the land was declared protected by the Kenyan
Government.268 In 1986, the Kenyan government evicted the Endorois
people from their traditional lands, resulting in a loss of many of their
animals and economic hardships.269 After many failed attempts to regain
access to their lands through Kenya’s legal system, the Centre for Minority
Rights Development and Minority Rights Group International filed a
complaint with the African Commission.270 This complaint claimed that the
“Republic of Kenya violated their right to practise religion, their right to
property, their right to culture, their right to free disposition of natural
resources and their right to development.”271
In seeking a resolution, the African Commission noted that “the terms
‘peoples’ and ‘indigenous community’ arouse emotive debates”272 and that
“there is no universal and unambiguous definition of the concept[s].”273
Furthermore, the African Commission found that “the term ‘indigenous’ is
not meant to create a special class of citizen but is linked to the notion of
‘peoples.’”274
Essentially, the African Commission believed that the notions behind
indigenous peoples are “closely related to collective rights, a concept that
can be used to address the historical and present-day injustices and

264. Inman et al., supra note 257, at 345.
265. Id.
266. Endorois, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R. Communication 276/2003, ¶ 6.
267. Id. ¶ 3.
268. Inman et al., supra note 257, at 345.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 346.
271. Id.
272. Endorois, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R. Communication 276/2003, ¶ 148, quoted in Inman
et al., supra note 257, at 346.
273. Endorois, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R. Communication 276/2003, ¶ 147, quoted in Inman
et al., supra note 257, at 346.
274. Inman et al., supra note 257, at 346.
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inequalities felt by sections of populations with nation states.”275 As such,
the African Commission found that provisions within the African Charter
include provisions allowing for people to retain rights as peoples in the
collective, which includes indigenous communities.276 The African
Commission, in effect, extended the categorization of “indigenous people”
to include groups of people who do not fit the more traditional definition of
indigenous peoples based on colonialization.277
E. Turkey and the UNDRIP
Turkey voted to adopt the UNDRIP in 2007.278 In clarifying its position,
however, Turkey stated that the UNDRIP “was non-legally binding, but
could serve as an important tool.”279 Moreover, Turkey declared it “did not
have any people in its territory that could be interpreted as indigenous
peoples . . . and believed that the Declaration referred to the exercise of
self-determination in line with the Charter obligations regarding noninterference in the sovereignty, integrity and political unity of States.”280
Based on these statements, Turkey appears to follow the colonialismbased definition of “indigenous people” and the modern interpretation of an
internal right to self-determination. Asserting this view is most
advantageous to Turkey since it can appear supportive of growing
international support while denying any existence domestically.
Turkey has already taken steps to use this position as leverage in the
international community. In response to a 2019 U.S. Senate resolution that
recognized the mass killing of Armenians by Turkey more than a century
ago as genocide, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the
resolution and threatened “parliamentary resolutions recognizing the
killings of indigenous Americans in past centuries as genocide.”281

275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id.
278. Press Release, GA Adopts UNDRIP, supra note 2.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Jonathan Spicer, Turkey Could Close Incirlik Air Base in Face of U.S. Threats:
Erdogan, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkeyusa-sanctions-incirlik/turkey-could-close-incirlik-air-base-in-face-of-u-s-threats-erdoganidUSKBN1YJ0LL/.
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VI. Legal Status of UNDRIP
The UNDRIP, like most United Nations declarations, is non-binding.282
The declaration could, however, provide evidence of either a codification or
crystallization of customary international law. Customary international law
consists of two elements: (1) “extensive and virtually uniform State
practice” and (2) “the belief that the practice is required by law (opinio
juris).”283 Article 38(b) of the International Court of Justice Statute provides
that the court should apply “international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law.”284 Opinio juris requires an examination of state
practice to determine whether there is an “understanding that such
[practice] arises out of legal obligations.”285 Essentially, customary
international law requires a relatively uniform and consistent state practice
regarding a particular issue and the belief that the practice is legally
compelled by international law.286
The rights within the UNDRIP were ultimately accepted by the greater
international community over thirty years ago.287 While not dispositive, the
three-decade discussion and the thirteen-year period since the UNDRIP’s
adoption demonstrate the international community’s acceptance of these
rights. As such, scholars argue that some of the rights outlined in the
UNDRIP are a codification of customary international law.288 Moreover, an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice provided that a UN
General Assembly resolution, such as the UNDRIP, could provide
“evidence for the purpose of establishing a rule of [customary international
law].”289
However, there is ample evidence that the states that signed onto this
declaration viewed it as non-binding.290 So, while there is wide-spread
282. U.N. Permanent F. on Indigenous Issues, Frequently Asked Questions: Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2 (n.d.) [hereinafter UNDRIP FAQ], https://www.un.
org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf.
283. Sylvanus G. Barnabas, The Legal Status of the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) in Contemporary International Human Rights Law, 6
INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 242, 245 (2017).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 246.
286. See id. at 244–46.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 249–51.
289. Id. at 250–51.
290. See, e.g., Press Release, GA Adopts UNDRIP, supra note 2 (highlighting the
Declaration as a non-binding text); UNDRIP FAQ, supra note 282 (“UN Declarations are
generally not legally binding; however, they represent the dynamic development of
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acceptance of the basic tenants of the provisions within the UNDRIP, it is
unclear whether the UNDRIP is a codification or crystallization of
customary international law. So, until or unless there is a demonstrable
belief by states that the they are legally compelled to follow the provisions
within the UNDRIP, its standing as customary international law will remain
in doubt.291 Still, the near universal support of the UNDRIP throughout the
international community is demonstrative of the resolution’s support and
may represent the start of a crystallization of customary international law in
the future.292 A further study would need to be conducted to determine if
the UNDRIP now qualifies as customary international law. However, that is
outside the scope of this Comment.
Conclusion
On its own, the UNDRIP will most likely afford little legal standing for
the Kurdish people to pursue recourse. However, a broader and more
defined definition that qualifies Kurdish people as indigenous people would
provide the Kurdish people with internationally recognized rights. This
clarification, along with Turkey’s membership in the United Nations,
should garner the Kurdish people support from the international community
in their battle to maintain cultural independence.
As a stateless people, the Kurdish people are limited in what assistance
international law might provide. Regardless of any potential legal standing,
the Kurdish people will require support of the greater international
community if they are to effect change in their circumstances. A clear
recognition on the applicability of the UNDRIP to the Kurdish people will
be an invaluable step towards that support.

international legal norms and reflect the commitment of states to move in certain directions,
abiding by certain principles.”).
291. See Barnabas, supra note 283, at 242–61.
292. See id. at 253. All but four states voted in favor of UNDRIP. However, three of the
States who initially voted against it now suggest they are in acceptance of the rights
contained within the UNDRIP. Id.
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